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1 Introduction
The global nancial crisis of 2007-2009 followed by the Great Recession have emphasized
the importance of developing macroeconomic models which study the interactions between
the nancial system and real business cycles. In the aftermath of the crisis, it is now
clear that restrictions in lending, higher borrowing costs and nancial regulation, all which
directly impact the credit markets, have translated into distortions in the wider economy.
As a consequence, a growing number of research papers and policy discussions on the role of
nancial intermediation, credit risk and bank capital in the transmission of various shocks
to the real economy have emerged in the past few years.1
The general consensus in the literature is that credit market frictions and risk sensi-
tive bank capital regulation (in the form of Basel II) can exacerbate procyclicality in the
nancial system and real economy (see Covas and Fujita (2010), Liu and Seeiso (2012)
and Angeloni and Faia (2013) for Basel II procyclicality).2 These potential adverse conse-
quences have led to a substantial shift in the policy debate, which now not only focuses on
the banksindividual solvency captured by bank adequacy requirements (microprudential
policies), but also on the role of macroprudential tools in preventing and managing the
build-up of nancial imbalances. The new Basel III Accords, set to be fully implemented
by 2018, intend to enforce banks to increase the quality of their assets, raise the capital
adequacy ratio, hold countercyclical bank capital bu¤ers and set loan loss provisions in a
timely manner before credit risk materializes (see Basel Committee of Banking Supervision
(BCBS) (2011) for further details and Saurina (2009) for a critical assessment of dynamic
provisioning systems). The objectives of the Basel III regulatory measures are to enhance
nancial stability, encourage more restricted lending in economic booms, mitigate systemic
risk and allow the nancial sector to better absorb losses associated with an eruption of a
negative credit cycle. Beyond the direct reforms Basel III imposes on the global banking
system, can countercyclical bank capital bu¤ers, which rise during economic upturns and
thus limit credit growth, also promote overall macroeconomic stability? To answer this
question it is important to fully analyze the interactions between the nancial sector and
the macroeconomic conditions. In this context, we need to comprehend the e¤ectiveness of
monetary policy rules in achieving price and output stability when credit market frictions
and regulatory requirements prevail.
This paper contributes to the growing macronance literature by promoting a fur-
ther understanding on nancial-real sector linkages, and studying the interactions between
bank capital regulation and monetary policy in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model with a borrowing cost channel and endogenous nancial frictions. These
market imperfections include collateralized lending, nancial regulation, risk of default at
1These papers include Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Meh and Moran (2010),
Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010), and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2013), among others.
2 In the literature of macronance, procyclicality refers to aspects of nancial and/or economic policies
which can exacerbate credit and real sector uctuations, and not necessarily to a positive correlation between
two variables. Therefore, countercyclical regulation is aimed at mitigating these amplication or procyclical
e¤ects.
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the rm level, and commercial bank losses.3 We show that default costs in the banking
sector are covered by risk sensitive bank capital adequacy requirements, which in turn may
initially mitigate procyclicality in nancial variables. At the same time, credit risk induces
further bank capital losses, resulting in an increase in the cost of bank capital as well as
stricter regulatory requirements, both which lead to higher borrowing costs.4 Firms in this
setup must borrow from commercial banks to nance labour costs. Therefore, the renance
rate, bank capital and the various credit market frictions described above (all which en-
dogenously impact the lending rate) translate into changes in the behaviour of the marginal
costs and the rate of price ination through the borrowing cost channel.5 Similar types of
short term borrowing costs have been utilized and empirically examined in the literature
since the contribution of Ravenna and Walsh (2006). These papers include Chowdhury,
Ho¤mann and Schabert (2006), Tillmann (2008), Fernandez-Corugedo, McMahon, Millard
and Rachel (2011) and De Fiore and Tristani (2013).6 Building on this literature, the bor-
rowing cost channel in our model is enhanced by a richer banking environment, regulatory
requirements and various credit frictions, which can explain important links between the
nancial sector and the real business cycle.
The simulated model suggests that countercyclical nancial regulation is very e¤ective
at fostering nancial and price stability (by moderating the borrowing cost channel e¤ect),
whereas a mildly credit augmented Taylor rule performs well in terms of attenuating out-
put uctuations (through an intertemporal substitution e¤ect). From a policy perspective
we conclude that: a) If the economy is hit by credit shocks then by setting countercyclical
bank capital requirements, regulatory authorities can achieve the anti-ination target of
monetary policy as well as reduce central bank losses (measured in terms of ination and
output gap volatility). In this state, central banks should react mainly to GDP and/or
mildly to nancial indicators and less to price ination; b) Following technology shocks,
macroprudential regulation can restore the traditional hawkish stance of monetary policy,
which in combination yield the lowest welfare losses. Under these conditions, central banks
can contribute to price stability through the standard demand channel of monetary policy
without amplifying inationary pressures via the monetary policy cost channel. Hence, for
productivity shocks, there are no gains from a credit augmented monetary policy "lean-
3We use bank losses and default costs in the banking sector interchangeably throughout the paper.
4Bratsiotis, Tayler and Zilberman (2014) also study the interactions between nancial frictions, reserve
requirements (not included in this model) and monetary policy in a DSGE model with a role for investments
and physical capital. In their paper the rms risk of default is fully transmitted to the banks risk of default.
Here we show that bank capital requirements can mitigate default costs in the banking system.
5 Indeed, we refer to this channel as the "borrowing cost channel" and not the standard "cost channel of
monetary transmission" as is common in this literature. The "cost channel of monetary policy", a¤ected
by changes in the policy rate, is only part of the wider "borrowing cost channel", which in our model is
driven mostly by regulatory requirements and credit market frictions.
6At the same time, other papers, including Rabanal (2007) and Kaufmann and Scharler (2009) nd
limited evidence of the cost channel transmission mechanism. The issue of the cost channel is therefore
still subject to debate, but for the purpose of this paper, this channel is employed to explain part of the
linkages between the nancial side and the real economy.
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ing against the credit cycle". Our model therefore indicates that nancial distortions,
countercyclical regulation and di¤erent types of shocks signicantly alter the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy and its optimal behaviour.
This paper is related to the following strands of literature. First, it contributes to
Agénor and Aizenman (1998) and its New Keynesian counterpart framework developed
in Agénor, Bratsiotis and Pfajfar (2013), by introducing a rationale for bank capital (and
explicitly modeling its costs), default costs in the banking sector, nancial risk shocks
originating in the banking system, countercyclical bank capital regulation and a credit
augmented type monetary policy rule. More specically, we evaluate macroprudential
policies in a framework capable of generating a negative relationship between the loan
rate spread and GDP, without relying on the costly state verication mechanism and bor-
rowersnet worth used in the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) nancial accelerator
type models.7 In fact, the additional nancial imperfections and Basel II type regulatory
rules introduced in our model amplify the countercyclical correlation between output and
borrowing costs, and induce further nancial accelerator e¤ects. The relatively small scale
nature of our setup also allows us to clearly disentangle and intuitively demonstrate the dif-
ferent transmission mechanisms linking the credit market conditions to the macroeconomy,
and explain the implications for optimal simple policy rules.
Second, this model relates to recent contributions which have studied the performance
of countercyclical rules along with the conduct of a lean against the credit cycle type
of monetary policy. For example, in a simple monetary model with nancial elements,
NDiaye (2009) shows that countercyclical regulation can support monetary policy in mit-
igating output uctuations while maintaining nancial stability. Kannan, Rabanal and
Scott (2012), Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2012) and Angeloni and Faia (2013) illustrate
that depending on the nature of the shock, a combination of a credit-augmented Taylor
rule together with a Basel III-type countercyclical rule, may be optimal in minimizing
a central bank loss function. Moreover, Suh (2014) demonstrates that macroprudential
policy a¤ecting directly the nancial market conditions has a limited impact on prices as
opposed to monetary policy. Contributing to these models, we employ a rich borrowing
cost channel which highlights the importance of Basel III in promoting nancial, price and
macroeconomic stability, as well as the welfare detrimental aspects of conventional mon-
etary policy. Indeed, even credit augmented Taylor rules generate only marginal benets
for nancial shocks and have no role following supply shocks.
Third, following nancial shocks we obtain a signicant trade-o¤ between output and
ination, supporting De Fiore and Tristani (2013) and Gilchrist, Schoenle, Sim and Zakra-
jsek (2014). In the latter, nancially weak rms are more likely to increase prices during
a crisis period as an attempt to maintain cash ows, leading to a rise in aggregate ina-
tion and violating the so called divine coincidenceof monetary policy.8 In the borrowing
7Most empirical evidence show a strong negative relationship between loan rate spreads and GDP uc-
tuations (see Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) and Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010) for example).
8 In the nancial accelerator models which operate through investment demand, output and ination
exhibit a strong co-movement (apart from cost push shocks). Thus, lowering the policy rate can simulta-
neously stabilize both output and ination.
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cost channel framework of De Fiore and Tristani (2013), an aggressive easing of monetary
policy under commitment is optimal in response to adverse nancial shocks. Unlike their
model, we generate a countercyclical loan rate spread regardless of the type of shock (more
consistent with the data as explained above). Additionally, instead of characterizing a
fully optimal (Ramsey) monetary policy, we study how credit market frictions and Basel
III type rules interact with simple standard and augmented Taylor rules, and compute
the optimal policy combination which minimizes macroeconomic volatility. To the best of
our knowledge, this model is a rst attempt to model the interplay between bank capital,
countercyclical regulation and the role of standard and augmented monetary policy in a
DSGE model with a borrowing cost channel altered by meaningful endogenous nancial
imperfections.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model with a detailed analysis
of the agents behaviour. Section 3 provides a discussion on the parameter calibration,
whereas Section 4 simulates the model following nancial and supply shocks. In Section
5 we examine the roles of monetary policy and macroprudential regulation in promoting
overall macroeconomic stability. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy consists of six types of agents: households (who are also labour suppliers),
a nal good (FG) rm, intermediate good (IG) rms, a competitive labour contractor,
competitive commercial banks and a central bank, which also acts as the nancial regulator.
At the beginning of the period and following the realization of aggregate shocks, the
representative bank receives deposits from households, issues bank capital to satisfy regu-
latory requirements and decides on the loan rate using a break even condition. The risk in
our model stems from the possibility of IG rms defaulting on their loans as their produc-
tion is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, which are unobservable when the loan
contract is agreed. Furthermore, the loan rate decision of each bank is made in light of this
risk, along with the banks expected ability to obtain the IG rmscollateral seized in the
case of default (explained below), bank capital requirements, and the costs of paying back
gross interest on deposits and bank capital to households.9 For a given loan rate, the IG
rms decide on the level of employment, prices and loans, with the latter used to fund wage
payments to households, who supply di¤erentiated labour via the labour contractor.10 At
the same time, households choose the level of consumption, deposits and bank capital given
their total income comprised of distributed prots, total returns from holding bank capital
9As bank capital prices and dividend policies resulting from changes in the price of equity are not
modeled in this framework, bank capital in our model is treated more like bank debt rather than equity.
In the Basel terminology, bank capital in this model therefore consists of "tier 2" capital and not "tier 1"
capital, which consists of equity stock and retained earnings. Nevertheless, there is still an ongoing debate
on whether under the new Basel III regulatory rules, banks would also be allowed to hold capital in the
form of loss-absorbing debt such as contingent convertible bonds.
10The labour contractor supplies homogeneous labour to IG rms by aggregating the di¤erentiated labour
provided from households and paying each one of them its wages. Thus, the labour aggregator simply acts
as an intermediary between households and IG rms.
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and deposits from the previous period, as well as labour income.
At the end of the period, the idiosyncratic shocks and hence the rms who default are
revealed. As loans are risky, the IG rms pledge output as collateral, which can be seized
by the lender in a default scenario. In these bad states of nature, there is also a possibility
that the break even bank does not recover any collateral and makes a loss. At the aggregate
level, bank capital covers for these losses, which are also endogenously related to the rms
credit risk. Furthermore, households, acting as bank holders, know the aggregate state
of the economy and can calculate banking sector losses. They account for these default
costs by demanding a higher return on bank capital such that they are indi¤erent between
holding risk free deposits and bank capital.
Finally, at the end of the period the commercial bank pays back gross return to house-
holds on deposits and bank capital, and all prots are distributed to households. We now
turn to describe in more detail the behaviour of each agent in the economy.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households, indexed by i 2 (0; 1), who consume, hold deposits,
demand bank capital and supply di¤erentiated labour to a labour aggregator.
The objective of each household i is to maximize the following utility function,
Ut = Ei;t
1X
s=0
s
(
[Ct+s]
1 & 1
1  & 1  
H1+i;t+s
1 + 
)
; (1)
where Ei;t is the expectations operator, conditional on the information of the ith household
available up to period t; and  2 (0; 1) denoting the discount factor. The term Ct denotes
consumption at time t; and Hi;t the time-t hours worked by household i. The term & denes
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, while  denotes the inverse of
the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
Households hold (real) bank capital, Vt, which pays an interest of iVt , and (real) bank
deposits, Dt, which bear an interest rate of iDt . Hence, total returns from holding bank
capital and deposits in period t  1 are respectively given by (1  Vt 1)(1 + iVt 1)Vt 1 Pt 1Pt
and (1+iDt 1)Dt 1
Pt 1
Pt
, with Pt denoting the price of the nal good. The term Vt 1 denotes
the bank capital risk premium, which is derived endogenously later in the text, but taken
as given in the households optimization problem. Also, in subsequent sections we explain
how the risk premium on bank capital relates to the probability of rms defaulting on their
loans (t). Further, households, acting as the bank owners, can calculate the aggregate
losses in the banking system.
Following the realization of the aggregate shocks, each household supplies di¤erentiated
labour to the labour aggregator and earns a factor payment of Wi;tPt Hi;t, where Wi;t denotes
the nominal wage.
At the end of the period, households receive all prots from IG rms, the commercial
banks and the nal good rm, denoted respectively by JIGt =
R 1
0 J
IG
j;t dj, J
B
t and J
FG
t . In
addition, households pay a lump-sum tax given by the term Lumpt (in real terms).
6
Finally, once the value of the nal good is realized at the end of the period, the rep-
resentative household purchases it for consumption purposes. Thus, the households (real)
budget constraint can be written as follows,
Ct +Dt + Vt  (1 + iDt 1)Dt 1
Pt 1
Pt
+ (1  Vt 1)(1 + iVt 1)Vt 1
Pt 1
Pt
+ (2)
+
Wi;t
Pt
Hi;t +
Z 1
0
JIGj;t dj + J
B
t + J
FG
t   Lumpt:
2.1.1 Consumption, Savings and Bank Capital Decisions
The rst order conditions with respect to Ct; Dt and Vt (taking the rate of returns and
prices as given) yield the following solutions,
C
  1
&
t = Et(1 + i
D
t )
Pt
Pt+1
C
  1
&
t+1; (3)
(1 + iVt ) =
(1 + iDt )
(1  Vt )
: (4)
Equation (3) is the standard Euler equation determining the optimal consumption path.
Equation (4) is the no arbitrage condition, relating the rate of return on bank capital to the
risk free deposit rate. In equilibrium, the interest rate on bank capital is set as a premium
over the deposit rate due to the default costs in the banking sector (derived later in the
text).11
2.1.2 The Wage Decision
The wage setting environment follows Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), and Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), where each household i supplies a unique type of labour
(Hi;t) with i 2 (0; 1). All these types of labour are then aggregated by a competitive labour
contractor into one composite homogenous labour (Nt) using the standard Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) technology given by,
Nt =
Z 1
0
H
w 1
w
i;t di
 w
w 1
; (5)
with w > 1 representing the constant elasticity of substitution between the di¤erent types
of labour. The ith household therefore faces the following demand curve for its labour,
Hi;t =

Wi;t
Wt
 w
Nt; (6)
11Markovic (2006) also derives a no arbitrage condition between the bank capital rate and the risk free
rate, with the mark-up depending on an exogenously given risk of default (among other variables). In this
model, the default costs in the banking sector, which determine the bank capital - deposit rate spread, are
endogenous with respect to both the risk of default at the rm level and the bank capital to loan ratio.
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where Wt denotes the aggregate nominal wage paid for one unit of the composite labour.
The zero prot condition for the labour aggregator, obtained by substituting (6) in (5),
yields the economy wide wage equation, Wt =
hR 1
0 W
1 w
i;t di
i 1
1 w .
Calvo (1983)-type nominal rigidity is assumed in the wage setting such that in each
period a constant fraction of 1   !w workers are able to re-optimize their wages while a
fraction of !w index their wages according to last periods price ination rate (t 1). These
non re-optimizing households therefore set their wages according to Wi;t = t 1Wi;t 1:
Moreover, if wages have not been set since period t; then at period t + s the real relative
wage for household i becomes Wi;t+sWt+s =
sWi;t
Wt+s
, where s = t  t+1  ::::  t+s 1.
Consequently, the demand for labour in period t+ s is Hi;t+s =

sWi;t
Wt+s
 w
Nt+s.
In equilibrium all re-optimizing households choose the same wage (W t ), and the optimal
relative wage in a log-linearized form (denoted by hat) is given by
\W t
Wt

=

!w
1 !w
dWt ,
withdWt  cWt  [Wt 1 denoting the log-linearized wage ination. In the absence of wage
rigidities (!w = 0), the real wage equals to the wage mark-up ( ww 1) multiplied by the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption (MRSt). Specically, WtPt =
w
w 1MRSt; where MRSt = N

t C
1
&
t and Nt = Ht:
12
Finally, as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) the wage ination equation is shown
to satisfy, dWt = EtdWt+1 + (1  !w) (1  !w)(!w) (1 + w)
"
\MRSt  
\Wt
Pt
#
; (7)
where real wages evolve according to,
dWRt  \WtPt

=
\Wt 1
Pt 1

+dWt   cPt ; (8)
with cPt  bPt dPt 1 representing the log-linearized price ination rate as a deviation from
its steady state. The motivation for including sticky wages is twofold: First, sticky wages
are necessary to match the sluggish and persistent behaviour of real wages observed in
data, and are important for obtaining a persistent response of ination without relying
on implausible values for price stickiness (as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005).
Second, wage stickiness is crucial for achieving a co-movement between output, real wages
and labour following technology shocks, a feature which is di¢ cult to capture in these class
of models (see DiCecio (2009) for further details). Loans in this model are provided for
working capital nancing, and therefore in order to produce a plausible, data consistent
and positive relationship between real wages, loan demand and GDP, it is essential to
introduce wage rigidities. As shown later, real wages move countercyclically with the loan
rate, and can mitigate a rise in credit risk following adverse shocks associated with higher
borrowing costs. The behaviour of real wages is thus important for explaining part of the
linkages between the nancial system and real economy.
12The full derivation of the wage setting environment is provided upon request.
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2.2 Final Good Firm
A perfectly competitive representative FG rm assembles a continuum of intermediate
goods (Yj;t with j 2 (0; 1)), to produce nal output (Yt) using the standard Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) technology,
Yt =
 Z 1
0
Y
p 1
p
j;t dj
! p
p 1
; (9)
where p > 1 denotes the constant elasticity of substitution between the di¤erentiated
intermediate goods. The FG rm chooses the optimal quantities of intermediate goods
that maximize its prots, taking as given both the prices of the intermediate goods (Pj;t)
and the nal good price (Pt). This optimization problem yields the demand function for
each intermediate good,
Yj;t = Yt

Pj;t
Pt
 p
: (10)
Imposing the above zero prot condition (equation 10) into equation (9) results in the
usual denition of the nal good price,
Pt =
Z 1
0
P
1 p
j;t dj
 1
1 p
: (11)
2.3 Intermediate Good Firms
A continuum of IG producers, indexed by j 2 (0; 1), operate in a monopolistic environment
and are subject to Calvo (1983)-type nominal rigidities in their price setting. Each IG rm
j uses the homogeneous labour supplied by the labour contractor, and faces the following
linear production function,
Yj;t = Zj;tNj;t; (12)
where Nj;t and Zj;t are the amount of homogenous labour employed and the total pro-
ductivity shock experienced by rm j, respectively. Moreover, the shock Zj;t follows the
process,
Zj;t = At"
F
j;t: (13)
The term At denotes a common economy wide technology shock which follows the AR(1)
process, At = (At 1)&
A
exp(At ); where &
A is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and At a nor-
mally distributed random shock with zero mean and a constant variance. The expression
"Fj;t represents an idiosyncratic shock with a constant variance distributed uniformly over
the interval ("F ;"F ):
Every rm j must borrow from a representative commercial bank in order to pay
households wages in advance. Specically, let Lj;t be the amount borrowed by rm j; then
the (real) nancing constraint must equal to,
Lj;t = W
R
t Nj;t: (14)
9
2.3.1 The Default Space
Financing working capital needs bears risk and in case of default the commercial bank
expects to seize rms output (Yj;t) with a probability of t, with  2 (0; 1) denoting
the steady state value of this probability. In these bad states of nature, there is also a
possibility of (1 t) that the break even bank cannot recover the IG rms collateral and
therefore makes a loss (similar to Jermann and Quadrini (2012)). The term t is assumed
to follow the AR(1) shock process, t = (t 1)&

exp(t ), where &
 denotes the degree of
persistence while t is a random shock with a normal distribution and a constant variance.
A shock to the probability of recovering collateral (t) represents a nancial (credit) shock
in this model, as it a¤ects directly the value of output the bank can seize in case of default
as well as the credit risk at the rm level.
In the good states of nature, where the rms do not default, each rm pays back the
commercial bank principal plus interest on the loans granted. Consequently and in line
with the willingness to pay approach to debt contracts, default occurs when the expected
value of seizable output (tYj;t) is less then the amount that needs to be repaid to the
lender at the end of the period. Specically,
tYj;t < (1 + i
L
t )Lj;t; (15)
where iLt denotes the interest rate on loans granted to IG rms.
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Let "F;Mj;t be the cut-o¤ value below which the IG rm decides to default. Thus, using
equations (12) and (13), the threshold condition can be dened as,
t

At"
F;M
j;t

Nj;t = (1 + i
L
t )Lj;t: (16)
Substituting equation (14) and solving the above for "F;Mj;t yields,
"F;Mj;t =
1
tAt
(1 + iLt )W
R
t : (17)
Therefore, the threshold value, from which the risk of default is derived later in the text,
is related to the lending rate, aggregate technology shocks and the real wages. However, in
our model, the loan rate not only depends on the risk free rate and the nance premium (as
in Agénor, Bratsiotis and Pfajfar 2013), but also on the probability of the bank recovering
collateral (credit risk shocks), the rate of return on bank capital and the bank capital-
loan ratio (as shown in subsequent sections). Hence, both the loan rate and probability of
default are a¤ected by the nature of the regulatory regime.
2.3.2 Pricing of Intermediate Goods
The IG rm solves a two stage pricing decision problem as soon as the aggregate shocks in
period t are realized. In the rst stage, each IG producer minimizes the cost of employing
13Similar to Agénor and Aizenman (1998), we assume for simplicity that no IG rm defaults if the
economy is at the good state of nature and the level of output is su¢ ciently high to cover for the loan
repayment.
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labour, taking its (real) e¤ective costs ((1 + iLt )W
R
t ) as given. This minimization problem
yields the real marginal cost,
mcj;t = (1 + i
L
t )W
R
t
1
Zj;t
: (18)
In the second stage, each IG producer chooses the optimal price for its good. Here Calvo
(1983)-type contracts are assumed, where a portion of !p rms keep their prices xed while
a portion of 1 !p rms adjust prices optimally given the going marginal costs and the loan
rate (set at the beginning of the period). The rms problem is to maximize the following
expected discounted value of current and future real prots subject to the demand function
for each good (equation 10), and taking the marginal costs as given. Formally that is,
max
Pj;t+s
Et
1X
s=0
!sps;t+s
"
Pj;t+s
Pt+s
1 p
Yt+s  mct+s

Pj;t+s
Pt+s
 p
Yt+s
#
; (19)
where s;t+s = s

Ct+s
Ct
& 1
is the total discount factor.14
Denoting P t as the optimal price level chosen by each rm at time t, and using the
denition of the total discount factor, the rst order condition of the above problem with
respect to P t yields the optimal relative price equation,15
Qt =
P t
Pt
=

p
p   1
 Et 1X
s=0
!sp
sC
  1
&
t+sYt+smct+s

Pt+s
Pt
p
Et
1X
s=0
!sp
sC
  1
&
t+sYt+s

Pt+s
Pt
p 1 ; (20)
with Qt =
P t
Pt
denoting the relative price chosen by rms adjusting their prices at period t
and pm =

p
p 1

representing the price mark-up.
Finally, using the aggregate price equation (11) with the Calvo sticky price assumption,
and log-linearizing equation (20) yields the familiar form of the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (NKPC), cPt = EtdPt+1 + (1  !p)(1  !p)!p dmct: (21)
In this model, the marginal cost is determined directly by the cost of borrowing from the
commercial bank (from equation 18). Therefore, monetary policy, bank capital and the
14The IG rms are owned by the households and therefore each rms discount value is s

Ct+s
Ct
& 1
:
Intuitively,

Ct+s
Ct
& 1
is the marginal utility value (in terms of consumption) of a one unit increase of IG
rms prots in period t.
15The sibscript j is dropped because all re-optimizing rms choose the same price so everything becomes
time dependent.
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regulatory regime, all which impact the loan rate as shown in the next sections, have also
a direct e¤ect on the marginal cost and thus the rate of price ination. To x ideas, we
refer to the channel which links between the loan rate, marginal cost and ination as the
borrowing cost channel.
2.4 The Banking Sector
2.4.1 Balance Sheet Identity
Consider a continuum of perfectly competitive representative banks indexed by k 2 (0; 1),
who can raise funds through either deposits (Dt), or issuing bank capital (Vt) in accordance
with regulation (as explained below). Both deposits and bank capital are used to nance
the IG rms labour costs and act as liabilities to households. Each bank k lends to a
continuum of rms and therefore its balance sheet in real terms can be written as,16
Lt = Dt + Vt; (22)
where Lt 
R 1
0 Lj;tdj is the aggregate lending to IG rms.
2.4.2 Lending Rate Decision
The lending rate is set at the beginning of the period before IG rms engage in their pro-
duction activity and prior to their labour demand and pricing decisions. As IG rms may
default on their loans at the end of the period due to idiosyncratic shocks, the repayments
to the commercial bank, for a given contract, are uncertain. Each bank k expects to break
even every period such that the expected income from lending to a continuum of IG rms is
equal to the total costs of borrowing these funds (comprised of deposits and bank capital)
from households. Specically,Z "F
"F;Mj;t

(1 + iLt )Lj;t

f("Fj;t)d"
F
j;t +
Z "F;Mj;t
"F
[tYj;t] f("
F
j;t)d"
F
j;t (23)
= (1 + iVt )Vt + (1 + i
D
t )Dt + cVt;
where f("Fj;t) is the probability density function of "
F
j;t. The rst element on the left hand
side is the repayment to the bank in the non-default states while the second element is
the expected return to the bank in the default states accounted for the probability the
bank recovers collateral (t).
17 The expression (1 + iVt )Vt + (1 + i
D
t )Dt is the return to
households for holding bank capital and saving deposits, which are both used to nance
loans to IG rms. Furthermore, the bank faces a linear cost function when issuing bank
capital, captured by the term cVt, with c > 0. These costs are independent of the state of
16The aggregate lending from the banking sector is given by
R 1
0
Lk;tdk , where each bank k lends to
contiumn of rms with identical loan demands. Because loans are identical for all banks the k subscript
can be dropped.
17Recall that with probability (1   t) the bank receives no collateral in the bad states of nature and
therefore makes a loss.
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the economy and reect steady administrative costs associated with underwriting or issuing
brochures for example. By contrast, the rate of return on bank capital is the main driving
force of the total bank capital costs (1+ iVt +c), and endogenously rises following increased
nancial riskiness and lower output levels, as shown later in the simulations section.18
Turning now to the derivation of the lending rate note that,Z "F
"F;Mj;t

(1 + iLt )Lj;t

f("Fj;t)d"
F
j;t 
Z "F
"F

(1 + iLt )Lj;t

f("Fj;t)d"
F
j;t  
 
Z "F;Mj;t
"F

(1 + iLt )Lj;t

f("Fj;t)d"
F
j;t;
where
R "F
"F

(1 + iLt )Lj;t

f("Fj;t)d"
F
j;t 

(1 + iLt )Lj;t

: Hence, equation (23) can be written
as,

(1 + iLt )Lj;t
  Z "F;Mj;t
"F

(1 + iLt )Lj;t   (tYj;t)

f("Fj;t)d"
F
j;t (24)
= (1 + iVt + c)Vt + (1 + i
D
t )Dt:
Using the banks balance sheet (equation 22), substituting (16) for t

At"
F;M
j;t

Nj;t =
(1+ iLt )Lj;t, and employing the value of output from the production function (equation 12)
gives,

(1 + iLt )Lj;t
  Z "F;Mj;t
"F
h
"F;Mj;t   "Fj;t
i
tAtNj;tf("
F
j;t)d"
F
j;t (25)
= (1 + iVt + c)Vt + (1 + i
D
t )(Lj;t   Vt):
Dividing by Lj;t, equation (25) can be written as,
iLt =
 
iVt + c
 Vt
Lj;t

+
 
iDt

1  Vt
Lj;t

+ (26)
+
R "F;Mj;t
"F
h
"F;Mj;t   "Fj;t
i
tAtNj;tf("
F
j;t)d"
F
j;t
Lj;t
:
Real wages and the amount of labour employed are identical for each rm and therefore
the volume of lending by each bank is also the same. Thus, the subscript j is dropped
in what follows. Moreover, the threshold value "F;Mj;t depends on the state of the economy
18From the technical point of view, the additional (exogenous) issuance cost per unit of bank capital (c)
is also added to control in a more tractable way for the loan rate steady state value. All other variables
which determine the loan rate behaviour are endogenous, and cannot be adjusted without altering the long
run values of the other economic variables of the model.
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(from 17) and hence is identical across all rms. Using the expression for Lj;t (equation
14) and dening t = Vt=Lt as the total bank capital-loan ratio, equation (26) reduces to,
iLt = (t) (i
V
t + c) + (1 t)
 
iDt

+
tAt
R "F;Mt
"F
h
"F;Mt   "Ft
i
f("Ft )d"
F
t
WRt
; (27)
with
tAt
R "F;Mt
"F
["F;Mt  "Ft ]f("Ft )d"Ft
WRt
denoting the nance premium.
To nd an explicit expression for the probability of default, it is assumed that "Ft
follows a uniform distribution over the interval ("F ;"F ): Therefore, its probability density
is 1=("F   "F ) and its mean " = ("F + "F )=2: The probability of default is given by,
t =
Z "F;Mt
"F
f("Ft )d"
F
t =
"F;Mt   "F
"F   "F : (28)
Thus, the probability of default depends on the range of the uniform distribution and the
threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock (determined by equation 17).
2.4.3 The Bank Capital Risk Premium Rate
We now turn to derive the premium on a unit of bank capital (Vt ), which determines
the mark-up of the bank capital rate over the risk free deposit rate in the households no
arbitrage condition (equation 4). As explained earlier, the commercial banks set the loan
rate in each period to the expected break even level. This implies that the price of loans
is determined by the cost of deposits and bank capital, adjusted for the risk premium and
the bank capital-loan ratio. Additionally, a fraction (1   t) of banks make a loss due to
their inability to retrieve collateral in the default states.
Households, who invest bank capital in all banks, know the aggregate level of rm
default and are able to calculate aggregate losses in the banking sector.19 Accounting for
bank losses, which translate into bank capital default, ensures that deposits are a safe
asset. The decision for households therefore involves calculating the bank capital default
rate such that the no arbitrage condition (given by equation 4) is satised. Specically,
Vt Vt = (1  t)
"Z "F;Mj;t
"F
[tYj;t] f("
F
j;t)d"
F
j;t
#
: (29)
Identity (29) guarantees that the total losses on bank capital (Vt Vt) are equal to the value
of collateral the failing banks expected to earn if they were able to retrieve tYj;t in the
19Note that neither the bank nor the household are able to distinguish ex ante which banks will be unable
to claim collateral. Only the proportion t is known.
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default states of nature.20 Substituting equations (12), (13) and (14) in (29) yields,
Vt Vt = (1  t)tAt
Lt
WRt
"Z "F;Mj;t
"F
"Fj;tf("
F
j;t)d"
F
t
#
:
Using the properties of the uniform distribution and rearranging, we obtain the risk pre-
mium for holding bank capital,
Vt = (1  t)
Lt
Vt

tAt
WRt
 
"F;Mt + "
F
2
!
t: (30)
The bank capital premium rate is a function of the cost of default, (1 t)

tAt
WRt

"F;Mt +"
F
2

t;
which stems from the possibility of banks making a loss in the states of nature where rms
default on their credit. The bank capital risk premium also depends negatively on the bank
capital-loan ratio, which, in turn, is determined by the regulatory requirements. The role
of bank capital regulation is therefore to solve the market failure associated with default
costs in the banking system.
2.4.4 Bank Capital Requirements and Countercyclical Regulation
The representative bank is subject to risk sensitive bank capital requirements imposed by
the central bank and set according to the Basel accords. At the beginning of each period
the bank must issue a certain amount of capital that covers a given percentage of its loans
to IG rms. As explained, lending to IG rms is of a risky nature and therefore the risk
weight on loans is dened as #t. The bank capital requirement constraint in real terms is
thus,
Vt = t#tLt; (31)
with t denoting the "overall" bank capital-loan ratio (dened below). Under the founda-
tion Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach of Basel II (which remains essentially the same
under Basel III), the risk weight on loans (#t) can be be related to the default probability
of rms estimated by the banks as it is perceived as a measure of credit risk. That is, it is
assumed that the default probability of rms is passed to the banks risk weight on loans
according to the following equation,
#t =

t

q
; (32)
where q > 0 represents the elasticity of the risk weight relative to deviations of the proba-
bility of default (t) from its steady state value ().
20Note that the remaining t proportion of banks make a prot of
R "F;Mj;t
"F
[(1  t)Yj;t] f("Fj;t)d"Fj;t such
that the aggregate gains from non-defaulting banks would o¤set exactly the losses outlined in equation (29).
Banks are assumed not to be risk sharing and these prots are transferred back to households as a lump
sum at the end of the period.
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The general consensus in the literature is that risk sensitive bank capital requirements,
in the form of Basel II, may amplify the procyclical e¤ects already inherent in the nancial
system. In this section, a countercyclical regulatory rule is specied, in line with one of
the recent proposals of the Basel Committee to reform Basel II and address this issue of
procyclicality (see BCBS (2011)).
For this purpose, the "overall" capital ratio (t) is dened as follows,
t = 
DCt : (33)
The term D 2 (0; 1) denotes the minimum capital adequacy requirements, also known as
the Cooke Ratio (set by legislation), whereas Ct represents the countercyclical component.
Under Basel II, the "overall" capital ratio is simply set at D with the cyclical element
having no e¤ect. Hence, under Basel II, t = 
D and Ct = 
C = 1.
However, under the new proposed Basel III, the adjustment of the cyclical compo-
nent can be related to deviations of the loan-output ratio from its steady state level.21
Specically,
Ct =

Lt=Yt
L=Y
C
; (34)
with C > 0 denoting an adjustment parameter. Hence, in periods of economic booms ac-
companied with an expansion in lending activities, a macroprudential rule like (34) tightens
bank capital requirements such that the cost of credit rises (see equation 35 below). The
rise in the loan rate, in turn, can mitigate the procyclical e¤ects of the nancial system
and real economy.
2.4.5 The Transmission Channels of Risk and Bank Capital on the Loan Rate
Using equations (28), (32), (33), (34) and applying the characteristics of the uniform dis-
tribution, the lending rate equation (given by 27) reduces to,
iLt = i
D
t +
"
D

Lt=Yt
L=Y
C t

q#
(iVt   iDt + c) +

tAt
WRt
  
"F   "F 
2
2t ; (35)
where the term

tAt
WRt

("F "F )
2 
2
t is dened as the nance premium, which itself is also a
positive function of the lending rate (from equations 17 and 28).
Equation (35) shows that the lending rate is positively related to the cost of borrowing
deposits from households, the nance premium, the bank capital-deposit rate spread and
21Other authors who use the loan-output ratio to dene a countercyclical regulatory rule include Chris-
tensen, Meh and Moran (2011) and Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2012). These papers emphasize the role of
the loan-output ratio as an important indicator of nancial risk. Our results would not signicantly change
if we used loan deviations from steady state or credit growth (as in Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012), for
example) as indicators to which a countercyclical rule should respond to. In our model, loans and output
always move in the same direction, with loans being the more volatile variable. Hence, the e¤ects of changes
in credit always dominates the change in output such that the loan-output ratio is mainly driven by credit
deviations.
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the issuance cost of bank capital. The bank capital-deposit rate spread and the cost of
issuing bank capital, in turn, are set as a proportion of the bank capital-loan ratio, which is
determined by the Cooke Ratio, and the risk weight on loans. Under Basel III, the lending
rate not only depends on the minimum adequacy requirement and the risk weight (the
Basel II case) but also on the countercyclical regulatory rule dened by equation (34).
We identify various channels through which the probability of default impacts the loan
rate. The rst, dened as the bank capital default channel, stems from a combination of a
positive level of default costs on bank capital and the no arbitrage condition, relating the
bank capital rate to the deposit rate and the bank capital risk premium rate (Vt ). The risk
premium on bank capital, in turn, depends on the risk of default at the IG rm level and
the bank capital-loan ratio (see equations 4 and 30). Second, the nance premium channel,
arising from the positive correlation between the risk of default and the nance premium,
which directly inuences the cost of credit. Third, the probability of default a¤ects the
lending rate also through the risk weight channel, resulting from the positive relationship
between the risk weight on loans and the risk of default. The latter channel is evident in
the IRB approach of Basel II (and Basel III) while the rst two channels prevail regardless
of the regulatory regime.
The bank capital-loan ratio in our model has an ambiguous impact on the loan rate.
On the one hand, tighter bank capital regulation increases the cost of credit through the
direct positive relationship between iLt and
Vt
Lt
= f(#t(t)), (the risk weight channel). On
the other hand, a rise in the bank capital-loan ratio reduces the risk premium on bank
capital, thereby lowering the loan rate via the bank capital default channel (see equation
30). With higher bank capital requirements, bank losses can be spread over more units of
bank capital resulting in an attenuation e¤ect on the bank capital premium rate and the
cost of credit. This result is consistent with the studies of Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004)
and Coleman, Esho and Sharpe (2006), in which holding more bank capital allows banks to
charge a lower spread on loans, where the spread depends positively on the risk of default.
Intuitively, banks holding bank capital above the regulatory requirements are expected to
face lower bankruptcy cost, thus allowing them to expand lending by reducing the interest
rate charged on loans. Fonseca, Gonzalez and Pereira da Silva (2010) examine the pricing
behaviour of more than 2,300 banks in 92 countries over the period 1990-2007, and show
that holding bank capital bu¤ers a¤ect the bank loan rate and thus the risk of default. In
our model, we endogenize the negative relationship between bank capital, aggregate losses
in the banking sector and the risk of default.
Nevertheless, the risk premium on holding bank capital (Vt ) is also directly positively
related to the probability of default at the IG rm level (t) and this e¤ect dominates
the attenuating e¤ect of VtLt = f(#t(t)) on 
V
t and consequently on i
L
t . This is due to the
elasticity of the risk weight (and thus bank capital requirements) with respect to deviations
of the probability of default (q), which is assumed to be less than 1.22 Hence, both the risk
22Having the strength of the risk weight channel (q) higher than unity can alter the results and weaken
the e¤ects of countercyclical bank capital requirements. However, most data indicate that the elasticity of
bank adequacy requirements with respect to the risk of default (under the Foundation IRB approach of
Basel II) is between 0:05 and 0:15 (see Covas and Fujita (2010) and Aguiar and Drumond (2009)).
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weight and bank capital default channels amplify a rise in the loan rate following adverse
shocks.
A key element in this setup is that the probability of default is a function of the loan
rate, while the bank capital rate is a function of the probability of default and commercial
bank losses (from the no arbitrage condition). Hence, an adverse shock, associated with
falling levels output (collateral), leads to increased risk of default, which raises the bank
capital rate and regulatory requirements. The increase in bank capital costs then translate
into an amplied rise in the loan rate. Therefore, the probability of default, through
its relationship with bank losses, regulatory requirements, the bank capital rate and the
borrowing costs, aggravates the impact on the rest of the nancial and economic variables.
These frictions give rise to signicant nancial accelerator e¤ects in this model.
2.5 Prudential Monetary Policy
The central bank targets the short term policy rate (iRt ) according to the following log-
linearized Taylor-type policy rule,23
biRt = diRt 1 + (1  ) hcPt + Y bYt + L=Y cLt   bYti ; (36)
where cPt  Pt   P;T denotes ination deviations from its target steady state value
(P;T ), bYt output deviations from its steady state value,  2 (0; 1) the degree of interest
rate smoothing and ; Y > 0 coe¢ cients measuring the relative weights on ination and
output deviations from their steady states, respectively.24
The new term added to the standard Taylor rule is given by L=Y
cLt   bYt, where
L=Y > 0: Thus, the central bank sets its policy rate also in part to "lean against the
credit cycle", and specically to deviations of the loan-output ratio from its steady state
level (as in Benes and Kumhof (2011), for example).25 In this way, during an expansionary
period, the probability of default and loan rate fall, both which further stimulate lending to
IG rms and raise the loan-output ratio. Consequently, the policy rate rises and mitigates
the initial decline in the lending rate, thereby dampening the expansion in credit and
output. At the same time, an increase in the policy rate can also result in higher price
ination given the presence of the borrowing cost channel in this model.
23Using the no arbitrage condition and the fact that the commercial bank does not borrow from the
central bank, the deposit rate is equal to the policy rate.
24Note that we include output in terms of deviations from its steady state value rather than Walshs
(2003) measure of output gap. Our specication is consistent with Faia and Monacelli (2007) and Meh and
Moran (2010) among others.
25Benes and Kumhof (2011) also use credit deviations as a variable to which a prudential monetary
policy responds to. Nevertheless, as explained earlier and as shown in the simulations below, loans are
more volatile than output, with the two variables moving always in the same direction. Hence, using the
loan-output ratio or just loans (both as deviations from steady state) in the Taylor rule produces very
similar results.
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2.6 Market Clearing Conditions
Equilibrium conditions must ensure that markets for goods, labour, loans, deposits and
bank capital clear. The supply of loans by the commercial bank, the supply of deposits by
households and bank capital issued in accordance with regulation, are all assumed to be
perfectly elastic at the prevailing interest rates and therefore these markets always clear.
The seizable collateral tYj;t in case of default is distributed to the households at the
end of the period. Thus, the goods market equilibrium satises the condition that realized
aggregate output is equal to aggregate consumption,26
Yt = Ct: (37)
3 Calibration
The model is calibrated, where applicable, within the range of the parameters proposed
by Smets and Wouters (2003,2007) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). The
baseline calibration numbers are summarized in the following Table 1,
26The lost output in case of default is already incorporated in the goods market clearing condition. This
is because households insure themselves against bank losses by requiring a higher premium on bank capital.
Moreover, collateral in this model is given by the level of output (and thus consumption), which already is
endogenously related to the probability of default.
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
 0.99 Discount Factor
& 1.00 Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption
 2.50 Inverse of the Frisch Elasticity of Labour Supply
w 11.0 Elasticity of Demand - Labour
wm 1.10 Wage Mark-up
!w 0.80 Degree of Wage Stickiness
p 6.00 Elasticity of Demand - Intermediate Goods
pm 1.20 Price Mark-up
!p 0.75 Degree of Price Stickiness
A 1.00 Average Productivity Parameter
"F 1.36 Idiosyncratic Productivity Shock Upper Range
"F 1.00 Idiosyncratic Productivity Shock Lower Range
 0.97 SS Probability of Banks Recovering Collateral
 0.08 Capital Adequacy Ratio
C 10.0 Adjustment Parameter in Countercyclical Rule
q 0.05 Elasticity of Risk Weight wrt Default Probability
c 0.10 Administrative Cost of Issuing Bank Capital
 0.80 Degree of Persistence in Interest Rate Rule
 1.50 Response of Policy Rate to Ination Deviations
Y 0.20 Response of Policy Rate to Output Deviations
L=Y 0.01 Response of Policy Rate to Credit Spreads
A 0.80 Degree of Persistence - Supply Shock
 0.80 Degree of Persistence - Credit Shock
Elaborating now on some parameters unique to this model; First, although the values
for C and L=Y are determined optimally within a grid search in the policy experiments
section, for illustrative purposes in the rst simulation section, these values are set to
10:0 and 0:01, respectively. We conduct these initial counterfactual experiments under
the assumption that the central bank places standard weights on output and ination in
the Taylor rule in order to highlight the transmission channels of these rules in isolation
(later in the text we compute the optimal policy combination of countercyclical regulation
together with standard and augmented Taylor rules).
Furthermore, the bank capital adequacy ratio () is set to 0:08, which represents a
oor value under Basel II, while the elasticity of the risk weight with respect to the default
probability (q) is calibrated at 0:05 (as estimated by Covas and Fujita (2010)).
Finally, we set the idiosyncratic productivity shocks range to (1; 1:36), and the steady
state probability of the bank recovering collateral () to 97%. These values, together with
a price mark-up of 20%, generate a steady state credit risk of 3:82%, a long run value of
2:54% for the return on bank capital and a loan rate of 5:16%.
20
4 Simulations
This section examines the cyclical behaviour of the macroeconomic and nancial variables
following both an adverse nancial shock to t and a negative supply shock to At. Under
each shock a comparison is made between the following three regimes:
 The rst baseline policy regime examines the case in which commercial banks are
subject to a Basel II type rule, and the central bank following a standard Taylor rule
(STR) (q = 0:05; C = 0; L=Y = 0, solid blue line).
 The second regime combines a Basel III type rule and a standard Taylor rule (STR)
(q = 0:05; C = 10:0; L=Y = 0, dashed red line).
 The third regime combines a Basel III type rule and an augmented Taylor rule (ATR)
(q = 0:05; C = 10:0; L=Y = 0:01, dotted black line).
4.1 Financial Shock
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions of the main variables of the model following
a 1% adverse nancial shock under the three regimes mentioned above.
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Figure 1 - Adverse Financial Shock
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Note: Interest rates, ination rate, the probability of default and the bank capital premium are
measured in percentage point deviations from steady state. The rest of the variables are
measured in terms of log-deviations from steady state.
The direct e¤ect of a negative shock to collateral recovery (risk shock) is a rise in
bank losses, probability of default and consequently the loan rate through the bank capital
default and nance premium channels. Furthermore, as the bank is subject to risk sensitive
bank capital regulation (Basel II), the risk weight on loans increases with the rise in the
probability of default, inducing an amplication e¤ect on the borrowing costs. It can be
shown that both the bank capital default and risk weight channels lead to an exacerbation
in the loan rate and risk of default behaviour compared to the case where the bank is not
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subjected to bank capital regulation or when there is no role for bank capital (which is the
case in Agénor, Bratsiotis and Pfajfar (2013)).
The increase in the loan rate, coupled with the rise in risk, raises the marginal costs
and price ination through the borrowing cost channel. Moreover, the policy rate rises in
response to the increase in prices, generating an additional upward shift in the bank capital
and loan rates, and to a decline in aggregate demand. This result captures the trade-o¤
between price ination and output following nancial shocks, as indicated by Gilchrist,
Schoenle, Sim and Zakrajsek (2014). The rise in borrowing costs reduces also the demand
for employment, which exerts a downward pressure on output and the demand for loans.
The slight fall in real wages attenuates the rise in the marginal costs following nancial
shocks, although this mitigation e¤ect is relatively small given that these shocks do not
directly impact the marginal costs, ination and thus the real wages.
Because the bank capital default and risk weight channels result in a further rise in the
loan rate and probability of default, these channels have an additional procyclical e¤ect
on the key economic variables. Indeed, the loan rate and the various credit frictions link
between the nancial system and real economy through the borrowing cost channel, as
explained above.
Turning now to discuss the implications of a countercyclical regulatory rule. Because
the loan-output ratio declines following adverse credit shocks, the required ratio of bank
capital to loans falls. As a result, bank capital requirements are loosened such that the
loan rate response is mitigated. At the same time, lower bank capital requirements can also
increase the loan rate via the bank capital default channel as shown earlier. However, given
our calibration, the direct positive relationship between bank capital requirements and the
loan rate dominates the negative link between the bank capital-loan ratio and the bank
capital premium rate, which positively impacts the lending rate. The focus is therefore
on the positive interaction between bank capital requirements and the borrowing costs,
which exhibit a more moderate rise due to the imposition of a countercyclical regulatory
rule. Consequently, risk rises by less, the demand for loans increases, and the rise in the
marginal costs and ination are less pronounced. All these e¤ects lead to a mitigation
e¤ect on output as well.
With an augmented Taylor rule imposed in addition to a countercyclical regulatory rule,
the impact of nancial shocks on output and the policy rate is further dampened, while its
e¤ect on the rest of the variables is hardly noticeable compared to a standard Taylor rule.
As the loan-output ratio falls, the central bank acts to raise the policy rate by less, which
mitigates the fall in current consumption and output. Furthermore, the moderated rise
in the policy rate attenuates slightly the increase in the loan rate, which acts initially to
mitigate the response of ination via the borrowing cost channel. However, as ination falls,
real wages and output increase, which create upward pressure on the marginal costs and
ination. Hence, the rise in real wages largely o¤set the fall in borrowing costs, which can
also explain why the nancial variables, marginal costs and ination are largely una¤ected
by an augmented Taylor rule. Output, on the other hand, is directly related to the policy
rate and therefore exhibits a much stronger reaction to a "lean against the credit cycle"
type of monetary policy.
23
4.2 Supply Shock
Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions of the main variables of the model following
a 1% negative supply shock under the three policy regimes considered,
Figure 2 - Negative Supply Shock
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Note: Interest rates, ination rate, the probability of default and the bank capital premium are
measured in percentage point deviations from steady state. The rest of the variables are
measured in terms of log-deviations from steady state.
A negative supply shock directly lowers the level of GDP and raises price ination via
the NKPC equation. As output falls, collateral declines as well, which through the nance
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premium channel, increases both the probability of default and the loan rate. The bank
capital default and risk weight channels behave similarly to adverse credit shocks and result
in a further amplication in the reaction of the loan rate and risk of default.
Beyond the direct impact of the productivity shock, the higher loan rate amplies the
response of price ination through the borrowing cost channel. A rise in ination lowers
real wages, which in turn has an attenuating e¤ect on the probability of default and the
loan rate. Note that compared to adverse nancial shocks, the drop in real wages is much
stronger following technology shocks, which reduces the impact of the borrowing cost chan-
nel. However, given the nature of the supply shock and the various transmission channels
of bank capital, which exacerbate the response of the loan rate, output falls, ination rises
and the demand for loans decrease. Finally, the policy rate rises in response to the hike in
ination, thereby creating an additional downward pressure on current consumption and
output, and to a further increase in borrowing costs.
A countercyclical rule leads to similar results to the case of credit shocks although its
e¤ect on the bank capital-loan ratio and the loan rate is stronger. Intuitively, the demand
for loans fall due to both the direct e¤ect of a negative supply shock, and the borrowing
cost channel. Moreover, the deviations in price ination and wages stem mainly from the
direct e¤ect of the productivity shock rather than the secondary impact resulting from the
loan rate behaviour. Risk shocks, nonetheless, impact wages and ination through their
e¤ect on the lending rate, which then feeds into the rest of the economy via the borrowing
cost channel. In other words, the borrowing cost channel following technology shocks is
weaker compared to the case where the economy is hit by nancial shocks. This implies
that countercyclical regulation, which directly a¤ects the loan rate, has a smaller e¤ect on
the real economy when compared to nancial shocks, despite having a strong impact on
the bank capital-loan ratio and the loan rate. As a result, the rise in the risk of default
and bank capital losses is mitigated, leading to a muted response of the rest of the key
variables in the economy via the borrowing cost, bank capital default, nance premium
and risk weight channels, as illustrated above.27 Overall, employment, loans and output,
all exhibit a more volatile response as a result of the direct e¤ect of the productivity shock
on the marginal costs.
Adding a macroprudential Taylor rule results in a moderated rise in the policy rate
due to the fall in the loan-output ratio. Hence, and similar to the case of credit shocks,
households increase their current consumption through intertemporal substitution. As a
result, the output response is mitigated, while the rest of the key variables are mostly
una¤ected.
In conclusion, following both nancial and supply shocks, the e¤ect of a countercyclical
Basel III type rule on the real economy is similar such that the procyclicality e¤ects are
subdued, though at di¤erent magnitudes due to the nature of the shocks. Nevertheless,
adding an augmented Taylor rule to a countercyclical regulatory rule acts mainly to stabilize
27As in the case of nancial shocks, the direct positive link between the loan rate and bank capital
requirements dominates the negative relationship between the bank capital-loan ratio and the loan rate
arising from the bank capital default channel. Hence, the loan rate response is mitigated as a result of the
lower bank capital requirements.
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the response of output (with standard Taylor rule parameters and a low value for L=Y ),
while its impact on the other variables is relatively small. This result implies that a
countercyclical rule may be a more e¤ective tool in stabilizing the nancial variables and
ination whereas output can be further stabilized using a policy rate tool reacting modestly
also to deviations in the loan-output ratio.
However, given that loans in this setup are relatively volatile, using a higher value for
L=Y results in a further drop in the policy rate, which can increase output beyond its
steady state level following adverse shocks, but at the expense of higher volatility in this
variable. Moreover, the rising levels of GDP translate to a higher ination rate through
a standard demand channel linking positively the output gap to ination. At the same
time, the lower policy rate induces a further mitigation e¤ect on the loan rate, which then
attenuates the volatility of ination via the borrowing cost channel. Therefore, we now
turn to investigate the potential trade-o¤ between maintaining output, price and nancial
stability, and nd the optimal coe¢ cients in the Taylor rule and countercyclical rule which
minimize central bank losses.
5 Policy Experiments and The Role of Monetary Policy
This section provides an analysis of the optimal mix of the conventional and unconventional
policy instruments outlined in the previous sections. For this purpose, unless otherwise
mentioned, we use the parameter values used in the previous sections with the central
bank aiming to minimize the following exogenous loss function,
Losst =
cPt 2 + y dY Gt 2 : (38)
withdY Gt = bYt dY Et dened as the welfare relevant output gap, anddY Et = (1+)( 1&+)cZt denoting
the e¢ cient level of output chosen by the social planner in a exible price and wage economy,
and without nancial frictions. We assume the central bank aims to minimize a standard
loss function consisting only of ination and output gap volatilities, with a relatively strong
weight on the latter. Microfounded versions of (38), obtained from taking a second order
approximation of the utility function, tend to yield an extremely low value for the relative
weight on the output gap (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) for example). However, in
practice, central banks are also concerned about stabilizing the output gap. Moreover, it is
not clear whether central banks try to maximize households welfare, despite its appealing
micro foundations. In general, central banks receive a mandate from the government which
they have to fulll. Therefore, and following the reasoning of Glocker and Towbin (2012),
we use an ad-hoc loss function and acknowledge that in order to assess central bank losses,
one must employ relative weights which come from outside the model. The relative weight
on output gap volatility is assumed to be xed at 0:5:28
We now compare between di¤erent policy rules (dened below) and examine which
one performs best in terms of minimizing the loss function described above following 1%
28Our robustness checks showed that changing this parameter within plausible values (between 0:1 and
1) made little di¤erence to our results presented below.
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nancial and supply shocks. Moreover, we investigate how the standard parameters in
the Taylor rule adjust with the introduction of the various macroprudential instruments.
The policy rules examined are: Policy I - Central bank responding only to ination in the
Taylor rule (solving for  only and setting Y = L=Y = 
C = 0). Policy II - Central
bank responding to ination and output deviations in the Taylor rule (solving for  and
Y and setting L=Y = 
C = 0). Policy III - Central bank responding to ination, output
deviations and the loan to GDP ratio (solving for ; Y and L=Y and setting 
C = 0).
Policy IV - A credit augmented Taylor rule and countercyclical bank capital regulation
(solving for ; Y ; L=Y and 
C). The optimal parameters which minimize the above
loss function are searched within the following ranges:  = [0 : 20]; Y = [0 : 20];
L=Y = [0 : 0:02] and 
C = [0 : 10].29
Tables 2A and 2B show how the value of each policy rule changes with the introduction
of additional policy instruments following credit and supply shocks, respectively.
Table 2A - Optimal Policy for Credit Shocks
 Y L=Y 
C Welfare Loss
Policy I 1.01 - - - 0.0119
Policy II 0.00 14.4 - - 0.0035
Policy III 0.00 17.9 0.01 - 0.0035
Policy IV 0.80 20.0 0.00 10 0.0003
Table 2B - Optimal Policy for Supply Shocks
 Y L=Y 
C Welfare Loss
Policy I 3.30 - - - 0.7581
Policy II 4.80 0.20 - - 0.6581
Policy III 4.80 0.20 0.00 - 0.6581
Policy IV 6.33 0.00 0.00 10 0.2030
Table 2A shows that when central banks follow an interest rate rule which only responds
to ination then the Taylor principle must hold ( > 1) for the real interest rate to
increase. However, if the central bank chooses an interest rate rule that weighs both
ination and output,  > 1 is neither a necessary nor an optimal condition following
credit shocks. The central bank in this case can harness expectations of output stabilization
without the need for a large increase in the real interest rate. Thus, it becomes optimal
to target output stabilization at a relatively high weight without responding to ination
uctuations ( = 0).
Intuitively, for economies where credit plays a key role for rms nancing, responding
too aggressively to price ination may result in higher borrowing costs and increased pro-
cyclicality in both prices and nancial variables. In contrast, lowering the policy rate by
29We do not consider extreme values of the countercyclical rule weight (C > 10) as they deliver insignif-
icant welfare gains, and could potentially produce large welfare losses should the policy maker misinterpret
the source of the shock. Our upper limit of C = 10 is consistent with Agénor, Alper and Pereira da Silva
(2013).
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responding to output (following adverse credit shocks) reduces the inationary impact of
the borrowing cost channel, which leads to a rise in the level of GDP. At the same time,
the higher output level and the lower policy rate have an inationary impact through the
demand channel, meaning that y cannot be exceptionally high. Note that in this model
output and loans move in the same direction, with the latter variable being more volatile.
Therefore, targeting mildly the loan to GDP ratio or strongly the level of output in the
Taylor rule yields very similar outcomes. Although not shown in the Table 2A, restricting
the response to output to a lower range results in a higher, yet contained, response to the
loan to GDP ratio. Nevertheless, as explained earlier, the central bank cannot react too
strongly to the loan to GDP ratio (or to output) given its inationary impact arising from
the standard demand channel of monetary policy.
A macroprudential policy tool reacting to the loan to GDP ratio (C) provides a more
targeted approach as it directly contains the inationary impact arising from the borrowing
cost channel (see policy IV). A countercyclical rule reduces signicantly central bank losses,
and together with a strong response to output in the Taylor rule (or a mild reaction to
the loan to GDP ratio if the weight on output were to be more restricted) provides the
best policy outcome. Hence, what our results indicate is that for credit shocks, ination
targeting is not the correct approach to mitigate ination and output volatility, as opposed
to macroprudential regulation which can perform better.
As shown in Table 2B, supply shocks exhibit more standard results of ination targeting
given that the output gap (a¤ected directly by the e¢ cient level of output) and ination
uctuate in the same direction, such that the trade-o¤ between these variables is mitigated.
Note however that the presence of the borrowing cost channel yields a lower optimal weight
on ination compared to values found in other studies (see Kannan, Rabanal and Scott
(2012) for instance).30 Moreover, as the loan to GDP ratio moves countercyclically with the
output gap following supply shocks, a credit augmented Taylor rule amplies the output
gap which exacerbates central bank losses. In fact, the optimal weight on ination increases
with a mild response to output in the Taylor rule, as both act to mitigate the volatility
of the output gap and ination. Finally, increasing the weight on the countercyclical rule
reduces losses due to its attenuating impact on the loan rate and therefore ination. This
also allows the central bank to weigh ination more heavily and target the real interest
rate in the Euler Equation (the standard demand channel of monetary policy). With a
countercyclical rule and consequently a higher response to ination in the Taylor rule, there
is no gain from the monetary authority reacting to GDP uctuations or the loan to GDP
ratio.
We now turn to ask a slightly di¤erent question: assuming that the weight on output in
the Taylor rule is xed at Y = 0:2; how does ination weight change with a countercyclical
regulatory rule and a credit augmented interest rate rule, and what is the impact on welfare
losses? Figures 3A (for credit shocks) and 3B (for supply shocks) show how switching on
each macroprudential tool alters the optimal ination weight parameters of a standard
Taylor Rule and central bank losses.
30Values of y < 0:1 in the central bank loss function produce a much smaller optimal , though not as
low as in the case for nancial shocks.
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Figure 3A: Relationship Between  ; Macroprudential Policies and CB Losses - Credit Shocks
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Figure 3B: Relationship Between  ; Macroprudential Policies and CB Losses - Technology Shocks
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Similar to the implications described above for credit shocks, Figure 3A shows that a
standard monetary policy (with a xed normal weight on output) can be welfare detrimen-
tal. The lowest welfare losses is achieved when  is at the lower bound, whereas a strong
countercyclical rule (C) or alternatively a low response to the loan to GDP ratio (L=Y )
is welfare enhancing.
For supply shocks, Figure 3B illustrates that the optimal weight on ination indeed
increases with the introduction of a countercyclical rule. In this case, central banks can
a¤ord to react more strongly to the demand side of the economy and increase output
further towards the e¢ cient level, without exacerbating price uctuations arising from
the monetary policy cost channel. In other words, countercyclical regulation restores the
strong anti-ination stance in the Taylor rule, and the combination of both these rules yields
the lowest welfare losses. Signicantly, countercyclical regulation is only benecial when
combined with strong monetary policy (higher ) and vice versa. For example, consider
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a positive supply shock where output increases by less than the e¢ cient level. If monetary
policy is too passive, the fall in the policy rate leaves the output gap at a suboptimally
low level. Countercyclical regulation exacerbates this ine¢ ciency by increasing the cost of
borrowing, causing output to move even further below its e¢ cient level. Finally, because
the loan to GDP ratio is procyclical with respect to output, a credit augmented Taylor
rule is not optimal unless the weight on ination is suboptimally high.
6 Conclusion
In the aftermath of the great recession, it is clear that nancial volatility and distor-
tions in credit markets have severe macroeconomic implications, and that the role of the
macroprudential toolkit ought to be investigated. We develop an important framework for
identifying the interactions between the credit markets and the real business cycle, as well
as evaluating the macroprudential roles of bank capital regulation and monetary policy
in promoting economic and nancial stability. Key features of this DSGE setup include
endogenous credit frictions, all which impact the behaviour of the loan rate through var-
ious transmission channels. Changes in the cost of borrowing, in turn, have meaningful
macroeconomic e¤ects through the borrowing cost channel, linking between the lending
rate, marginal costs and price ination.
Bank capital adequacy requirements in this model cover for unexpected bank losses,
resulting in a lower premium charged on bank capital, and hence reduced procyclicality
in the nancial system. At the same time, an increase in the rms risk of default leads
to a rise in bank capital requirements, which through a direct cost e¤ect, may aggravate
loan rate volatility. We show that the latter e¤ect in this model dominates such that risk
sensitive bank capital requirements (Basel II regulation) amplify the movements in bor-
rowing costs despite their role in attenuating bank losses. Numerical analyses conrm that
countercyclical bank capital regulation (as proposed by Basel III) contribute to nancial
and economic stability. This policy instrument is shown to be particularly e¤ective fol-
lowing credit shocks. Credit augmented monetary policy, on the other hand, is shown to
be powerful in moderating output uctuations but at the expense of inationary pressures
arising from the demand side of the economy.
Our results imply that central banks should reduce their ination response in the Taylor
rule in face of higher inationary pressures and in the presence of a borrowing cost channel
driven mainly by nancial frictions. However, weakening the impact of the borrowing
cost channel, by introducing countercyclical regulation, allows central banks to be more
stringent on ination and control for price volatility via the standard demand channel of
monetary policy, especially following supply shocks. As for credit shocks which directly
a¤ect default risk, bank losses and the loan rate spread, Basel III type rules are extremely
benecial in terms of mitigating economic volatility. In this case, ination targeting
through a typical Taylor rule is always welfare detrimental. These state contingent results
indicate the importance of identifying the source of economic disturbances for the design of
macroprudential regulation and monetary policy (in line with Kannan, Rabanal and Scott
(2012)).
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A key practical issue in the context of our paper and more generally in the macropru-
dential literature is how macroprudential policies can be implemented without adversely
a¤ecting the credibility of central banks and regulatory authorities? The common tradition
in central banks is to target ination in an aggressive manner, but if nancial regulation can
perform better in terms of achieving price stability, how would this impact the anti-ination
credibility of central banks? Hence, these macroprudential tools must be calibrated jointly
with a transparent communication of the specic roles of central banks and the regulatory
authorities, which in essence may achieve the objectives of traditional monetary policy in
periods of nancial distress.
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7 Appendix
Log Linearized System
The Euler Equation (with bYt = cCt),
bYt = EtdYt+1   & hciDt   EtdPt+1i :
Marginal Costs, dmct = biLt + dWRt  cZt:
Employment Demand,
cNt =  w hdWRt + biLt i+ bYt + (w   1)cZt:
Marginal Rate of Substitution (with bYt = cCt),
\MRSt =
1
&
bYt + cNt:
Total Productivity Shock, cZt = cAt + c"Ft :
Probability of Default,
ct =  "F;M
"F;M   "
biLt + dWRt  cAt   bt :
Wage Ination,
dWt = EtdWt+1 + (1  !w) (1  !w)(!w) (1 + w)
h
\MRSt  dWRt i :
Real Wages, dWRt = [WRt 1 +dWt   cPt :
Loans, cLt = dWRt + cNt:
Lending Rate,
biLt = 1(1 + iL)
8<: 
 
1 + iV
ciVt + (1  ) (1 + iD)ciDt +   iV + c  iD h b#t + bti+
+A 
2
WR
(" ")
2
h
2ct  dWRt +cAt + bti
9=; :
Bank Capital Rate, ciVt = ciDt + V
(1  V )
cVt :
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Bank Capital Premium Rate (Aggregate Bank Losses),
cVt =   (1  ) bt +cLt   bVt + bt +cAt  dWRt +ct + ("F;M )("F;M + "F )["F;Mt :
Regulatory Bank Capital, bVt = bt + b#t +cLt:
with, b#t = qct:
bt = C cLt   bYt :
Taylor Rule,
biRt = diRt 1 + (1  ) hY bYt + cPt + L=Y cLt   bYti+ mpt :
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC),
cPt = EtdPt+1 + (1  !p)(1  !p)!p dmct:
Output Gap, dY Gt = bYt  dY Et :
wheredY Et = (1+)( 1&+)cZt:
37
